Tuesday, February 2, 2016

36 Process projects in a world of physical objectives. Forest Landscape Restoration in India-VII.

Landscape approach and the art of 'muddling through'

As can be seen from the somewhat ambivalent results of various ‘integrated’ approaches in the past, implementation of the Green India Mission, GIM (or the forest landscape approach, FLR, in general) can be expected to be less than perfect. Given the predilection of academic researchers to judge the results against very exacting standards of equity and process integrity, the ultimate results are bound to fall short. However, state actors (e.g. forest departments) are answerable, based on a completely different set of  expectations, to the state organs (Parliaments, statutory  auditors, courts, etc.): that expenditures result in measurable physical outputs.  Processes are seen only as one component of the means to the ends, and there is no excuse for failure to produce physical output merely on the plea that the people are not ready, or the process did not throw up a consensus, etc.



(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)

Kemmangundi, Karnataka landscape: naural forest and coffee shade trees (silver oak) 

In a world where the official environment requires clear-cut physical results, certain precautions are essential in taking up projects or activities that are strong on the rhetoric of process-orientation.  A basic precaution is to ensure that the project has a core of sure-fire physical outputs that will be achieved through the normal working systems of the departments concerned, regardless of the success, failure or quality of the processes prescribed. No government department will even think of getting into any considerable expenditure programme unless there were some physical output guaranteed, especially a land-based department like the forest, where obviously some sort of crop has to remain at the end of the day. Because the process component is by definition bound to be a disappointment (especially with the constant changing of objectives and redefining of measuring scales by social scientists),  the implementing agency will be able to justify the expenditures only if there is a physical resource left at the close of project. That is why, in past project interventions, the forest departments (at least in India) have held almost fanatically to the crop development targets, much to the chagrin of the social analysts. This is also the reason why programmes like the social forestry (SF) projects, the DFID-funded Western Ghats Forestry Project (WGFP), and the joint forest management (JFM) programme, are seen as successes by the department, even though they are almost complete deemed failures from the sociologists’ viewpoint. Physical targets are the safety nets of the forest department, which operates in a remorseless world where inputs have to match with some concrete physical result. Indeed, if any substantial incremental (extra) expenditure is to be incurred, say for special project staff and project directorate and planning/management units, then it would be foolhardy for the department to ignore physical outputs (otherwise the extra expenditure cannot be justified, and will probably be recovered from the officials responsible, or disciplinary action initiated against them).

This is also the reason why exact synchronization of process with physical operations cannot be maintained: the plantations will be raised even if the committees are not formally present (which has been touted as a major deficiency), and communities may have to play catch-up with the physical progress at times. Sometimes, no doubt, believing is seeing (the thought precedes the reality), but most of the time in the real world, in fact people wait to adapt to a changing physical reality brought in by outside forces: seeing is believing. On the other hand, if a purely process-centered project is being pushed by policy makers (in our experience mainly the international donors and consultants, to which JICA is perhaps an honorable exception), then local counterparts in the recipient countries would be wise to rigorously eliminate all extra expenditure, all special staff and directorates, for example (which may end in zero physical output, but lots of workshops, and overseas consultants, whether paid for by the implementing agency or directly by the donor through the technical cooperation component). They should rather attach the additional work relentlessly to existing positions and agencies. In the Green India Mission (GIM), for instance, national coordination was entrusted to the existing National Afforestation and Eco-development Board (NAEB) at the ministry of environment and forests; in the states, the existing State Forest Development Agency (SFDA) and the district FDAs are to be entrusted the new responsibility, and the operations in the field also will be handled by existing structures; this is as well, since there is no guaranteed funding for the field operations.

The dilemma with such ambitious, over-arching, all-embracing, holistic, integrated, process-priority interventions like the landscape approach is that they want to bring together all players to indulge in exhaustive discussions and consultations before embarking on action, but the catch-22 situation is that they will not be able to pull in collateral actors unless they hold out carrots in the form of financial resources, infrastructure investment, perks like foreign visits or at least buildings, vehicles and computers, and so on. But the paradox is that money for such components can rarely be garnered (whether from government budgets or from international aid agencies) on any large scale unless there is a guaranteed physical result of appropriate magnitude. To incorporate such physical results, many decisions will have to be taken at the time of presenting the project proposal itself, thereby pre-empting the process activities. If communities feel that the department may have some substantial money in its hampers, they may deign to come to consultations; if they know that the department has still not got the funding, they may not be interested in mere talk.

Even with committed funding and guaranteed physical outputs, the state auditors may well pull up the departments if there is a mis-match between targets shown in the project document and the actual outcome on the ground, as may well happen if processes are permitted to dictate in-course corrections and modifications in operations.  Thus the deviation from the model-wise plantation targets in the approved project document was made a big issue in the audit of the WGFP described previously, because the donor agency’s stand against pre-determined models and targets (this was supposed to be a process project) was limited to oral and personal communications, and could not be put up to the audit authorities, who only recognized the cabinet-approved final project documents (FPDs).  Based on such unpleasant experiences, the author strove to incorporate in the GIM document a paragraph especially to the effect that being a process-based programme, actual achievements may not conform exactly to the model-wise areas indicated in the document. Whether audit will understand this during the inevitable post-mortem analyses is of course left to the future. In any case, if there are mid-corse deviations, implementing agencies should not neglect getting such changes approved or ratified at the highest required levels. Thus, if the original document was approved at the cabinet level, it should be ensured that all major deviations are also got approved by the donor and the state government at the Cabinet level.

One of the recurring dissatisfactions expressed by social analysts, with projects implemented by the forest departments, is their unwillingness to let go the control of the forest areas to the community. Social environmentalists want JFM and forest governance to go to the next level, where communities will be the sole masters rather than mere participants (see, e.g. Lele & Menon, 2014). The donor agency, DfID, was especially disappointed with the pace of this type of institutional change in the WGFP in Karnataka, which was probably the reason for not extending the project to a second phase after 2000. However, social environmentalists and aid agencies must understand that their interventions are usually short-lived (three to five years for a Ph.D. scholar, five to ten years for an externally aided project),   and the financial contribution is usually miniscule in proportion to the national budget; obviously it has to fit into the existing departmental set-up, and not vice versa. While the integrated approach looks good in theory, words come cheap, and if all these aspects are actually to be covered by action on the ground, there will probably be not enough resources for even one landscape, let alone for a national programme like the GIM. This does not mean that departments and communities should fold their hands in their laps and sit quiescent; it means, instead, that they will probably plan and keep on the shelf  a series of smaller interventions, and opportunistically fulfill whichever are possible depending on the funds and personnel available from different sources. This calls for a time horizon much longer than the five to ten years of an average externally aided project. At the end of the project, the forest department (or whichever is the main implementing agency) is still in place, and has to take care of things just as if the project never existed; not the least of the responsibilities being the continuing salaries of the staff added for the project, and further protection and tending of the plantations and community institutions set up during the project . Thus, the implementing departments have to be pardoned if they do not fall in with the more extreme urgings of the aid agencies and social experts to abdicate their role and position with alacrity.

The danger in over-arching concepts like ‘integrated’ or ‘holistic’ or ‘landscape’ or ‘national’ or ‘global’ is that they may lull the user into a sense of omniscience and omnipotence that is not justified. It is because of this fatal attraction of big words that many well-intentioned schemes and projects that have over-weening ambitions of social engineering do not work, as demonstrated by James C.Scott in his book Seeing Like a State (Scott, 1999) on ‘high moderrnism’ and its relevance to large projects (the sub-title being How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed). In this context, Lindblom’s contrast between ‘synoptic’ and ‘incremental’ programs and the option of “muddling through” rather than claiming some perfect solution is surely pertinent and cautionary to landscape approach enthusiasts (Lindblom, 1959, 1979).

In conclusion, is submitted this statement made by the author, as DG Forests of India at the Roundtable on “Forests and People”, during the High Level Segment of the UN Forum for Forests, 2 February 2011:

“Forestry in modern India has, over the past one and a half centuries, built on two major foundations: firstly, giving protection to the resource itself by legal and administrative measures to identify and notify forest reserves, and secondly, working with the communities to maintain over the long term the productivity of services and materials from the forests, in support of their agricultural needs and livelihood occupations…  It has been our experience that all the different strands of the polity are important in ensuring the long-term survival and sustainable management of this precious resource: well-thought out legislation, a strong and independent judiciary, strong community and civil society participation, and a professional state forester cadre and other administrative personnel and apparatus”.

(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)


References (for all sections)

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Monday, February 1, 2016

35 Green India Mission (GIM): carbon with benefits. Forest Landscape Restoration in India-VI.

The Green India Mission (GIM): carbon sequestration with benefits

(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)

This brings us to the final (and most recent) application of the landscape approach in forest restoration in India, the Green India Mission (Government of India, 2010, 2011). This started out as a straightforward forest carbon sequestration programme statement  as one of the eight missions of the prime minister’s National Action Plan on Climate Change. However, it was apparent from previous experiences, such as the social forestry projects and the JFM based projects, that any intervention in the forest sector was bound to have a whole trail of collateral considerations, external effects, and social and environmental concerns, so that it would be foolhardy to design a project or programme solely for increasing carbon in the standing forest crops. Therefore, while at the core there remained the target of raising 5 million hectares (mha) of new forest and improving the condition (standing volume) of another 5 mha of existing growth, there had to be a process-oriented, bottom-up, participatory, approach to identifying the locations and character of these crops and interventions. As can be seen from the mission document and brochure, the actual interventions would be integrated with  restoration and improvement of a variety  of ‘ecosystems’ or ecological types, such as forest of various densities, wetlands, scrubland, grassland, mangroves, cold desert, abandoned mines, and agro-forestry, and social forestry-type interventions  on 3 mha non-forest land , not forgetting institutional lands, urban and peri-urban lands, and so on. Thus the programme would have multiple benefits apart from sequestering carbon, such as improving habitats and conserving biodiversity[1], restoring degraded lands and reducing soil and water loss, improving urban and rural environments, and supporting livelihoods through such interventions (this could be from agro-forestry, or from non-timber products in the forest or outside it, and integration with other rural sectors such as livestock/fodder, etc.). There are also to be a number of “cross-cutting” interventions like livelihoods enhancement, improving fuel efficiency of wood-burning stoves and promoting alternative energy, etc.

Hacked forest. Purdal, Shimoga, Karnataka, May 1990

Result of protection, Purdal, Shimoga, Karnataka, May 1990

Of specific interest here is the explicitly stated intention to adopt the “landscape approach”, which is interpreted as small to medium catchments around the village/ settlement of say 5000-6000 ha. The mission is to be multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder, with the community  being in charge of identifying problems, devising responses, and monitoring the implementation, which is expected to be done through the gram sabha (GS) and the “revamped” JFM committees  and Forest Development Agencies (FDAs) in the districts under the aegis of the panchayat raj  institutions (PRI). The challenge lies in the fact that the government has not provided separately in the Plan document or annual budgets for the Rs.45,000 crores[2] (say USD 7 billion) that is the estimated  cost over the next 10 years; the mission is to be funded by convergence from other on-going programmes, schemes, and missions, such as the flagship Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) which has a budget of around Rs.50,000 crores a year (Government of India, 3 March 2015).  

Criticisms and problems of the landscape approach in GIM

Not surprisingly, social environmentalists and commentators have been quick to jump on the GIM on account of the possible equity repercussions (as in the case of the SF projects, JFM in general, WGFP in particular, etc.).  The Forest Rights Act website (www.forestrightsact.com) describes the “Dangers of the Green India Mission: A formula for more land and resource grabbing”, and states that it is all a ploy to grab the communities’ resources and convert them into carbon credits. Sourish Jha, Assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, P.D.Women’s College, Jalpaiguri, West Bengal, charges that “the so called community institutions implicitly or explicitly involve an inclusive technique of exploitation of forest communities under the rubric of ‘public-people participation’.” His paper seeks to “expose further the neo-liberal schemata for incentivization of the community service through GIM for raising carbon stock to promote an integrated carbon market which ultimately will lead to defacement of the organic relationship between the community and the forest” (Jha, no date, probably 2011?). The web-based journal Equations (December 2011) calls the GIM “India’s REDD+ Action Plan to disempower and evict forest communities from their own homelands”.  A parallel paper on the equitabletourism.org website (ascribed again to Equations) charges that “GIM targets these areas for large scale afforestation programmes with fast growing native species and closure to grazing on rotational basis thereby preparing the ground for displacing the forest communities from these last forest areas, so depriving them of their habitat and livelihood options”. In a more balanced critique, Sumana Dutta (2016) feels that the GIM document is handing down a pre-conceived menu of options, which may not all be appropriate in the specific situations of a locality, such as the Bankura forest of West Bengal that the author was familiar with. On a different note, Dutta very perceptively also comments that the experience of the ground staff needs to be brought in, which has been affirmed in this author’s  response in the Letters column of the following issue of EPW (Dilip Kumar, 2016).
Degraded Minor Forest, Honnavar, Karnataka, May 1990. Note plantation on hill-top

Some comments may be not out of place  here from the viewpoint of the forest administration. Firstly, it is very doubtful whether any carbon sequestered through increased growing stock on the ground, will ever be parlayed into dollars under the REDD+ scheme, since India is very unlikely to be a major candidate for international carbon funding, as explained previously by the author (Dilip Kumar, 2014b). Therefore, it may be an exaggeration to say that carbon markets are going to threaten local uses and communities. Secondly, the carbon captured has been seen consciously as a side benefit in the GIM document, although it is true that the first impetus came from the climate change mitigation interest. Although the initial drafts may have been cast mainly in terms of biomass accrual and carbon capture (much as the early draft of the WGFP was cast mainly in terms of improved status of the forests), those who were present at the discussions leading to the changed concept of multiple co-benefits will bear witness to the sometimes heated arguments that accompanied the drafting process. The point made by the foresters (among them this author) was very much on the lines that the social commentators are making, that it is difficult to make interventions in India’s forests without bringing in train social effects, and hence it is difficult, and inadvisable, to try to make projects aiming at increasing biomass on the ground, a purely technical problem.

Thirdly, almost any land-based intervention in India is going to have repercussions that may not always be equitable. The green revolution in agriculture, for instance, obviously has better benefits for the larger and better-off land owners, and mechanization and crop and composition technical change often has repercussions on the employment of low-skill wage labour (see previous references to Myrdal, 1968, pp.1344-45, 1367). But this does not mean that no change or progress should be attempted. Similarly in forestry, some interventions like closure of a particular patch of forest may impose costs on the landless or the women, especially in the initial years, but these could be compensated by earmarking other areas or developing sustainable harvesting practices, varying the density of planting,  and so on. In the single-interest schemes of the past, the forest department used to take up plantations on a restricted area without consideration for such spill-over effects, but under JFM and now the landscape approach, it is expected that the whole situation will be addressed, including provision for the landless, the women,  NTFP collectors, bamboo workers, etc. Perhaps the most important difference in the landscape approach would be the way the situation analysis and problem identification will be developed before finalizing the annual operational plans. The specific  models in the GIM document should therefore be taken as just suggestions, and the actual interventions are to be worked out on the ground through discussions.

During the formulation of the GIM and the public consultation sessions, feedback from many forest officers (privately to the author; the foresters were seldom given a hearing in public) was that the coordination of many different departments would be a problem, and that the only   feasible way to guarantee some useful outcome would be to give the implementing department a clear-cut objective and physical target, give it clear-cut and full responsibility for its own efforts, and provide the funds in a timely and dependable manner. For example, the forest department will be happy to take the responsibility for, say, raising nurseries and fuelwood and fodder plantations; but they would not be able to guarantee the timing and appropriateness of actions of other agencies, private or government, like the extension of compressed cooking gas fuels, minimum support price purchases of collected non-timber forest products, or provision of animal health services, and so on. This, of course, would relegate to lower priority the bottom-up, open-ended, consultative, community-led process envisaged in the landscape approach.

The GIM seeks to meet such problems by suggesting a somewhat convoluted management structure, by assuming that the central control will be with the district planning forum (a panchayati raj institution of elected representatives), while the funds may flow directly from the centre or through the district Forest Development Agency (FDA) which is looking after the National Afforestation Programme (NAP), and thence to the implementing entities which may be any of the bodies at the village or community level, under both the PRI umbrella (including, among others, the Forest rights Committees, Biodiversity Managememnt Committees, etc.), and the community-based organizations (CBOs) sponsored by the line departments (like the village forest committees, VFCs). Since synchronization of various components will depend on the willingness of other agencies not under the project’s control, the end result of an integrated project, however noble the intentions, may well be a lop-sided development of those elements that were in the control of the principal implementing department or agency.

A special problem with the GIM as rolled out in recent years is that funds have not been ear-marked in the national plan (see the author’s critique of the XII Plan, Dilip Kumar, 2015). On the other hand, most of the money is supposed to be brought in from other programmes like MNREGA, Plan schemes like the NAP, Finance Commission devolutions to the states, the Compensatory Afforestation funds (CAMPA), other Climate Change Missions, and so on. This poses the question, what is the real additionality contributed by the GIM. If the forest departments of the states  themselves may tend to see the GIM as an unnecessary addition to their work burden, with little financial backing, the other departments and agencies that are supposed to coordinate with the GIM management would tend to see it as a completely useless intrusion. Even the PRIs, the district planning structure, and the village bodies (Gram Sabha) may well see the GIM as an imposition, if it comes asking for funds from their budgets in addition to their time and efforts. This may well be the killer assumption that will make its success unlikely. The same would probably be true of any integrated, multi-sectoral approach: unless it comes carrying gifts (budget, expertise, technical cooperation, capacity building, infrastructure improvement, support for NGO and SHGs, foreign visits, and so on and on),  the target groups are liable to wonder why they should put their resources and time at its disposal.

Social objectives and the Forest Department

A question comes up, how far is the forest department responsible for social change and setting right inequities in the society. Sharachchandra Lele (Lele & Menon, 2014, p.52) accepts that poverty alleviation by itself is not a fair criterion to judge the success of JFM. In fact, if one makes a dispassionate economic assessment, it is not clear that poverty can be removed (even for forest-dependent tribals and others) by depending solely on forest produce, as returns from forestry are relatively low per unit effort and resource.  For example, after all the organizational effort for collection of tendu (Diospyros) leaves for the beedi (leaf-rolled smokes), the average collector is left with less than a month’s worth of wages in a year in Central India, at considerable cost to the trees’ growth as they have to be repeatedly cut to get a flush of leaves (and it may be added that beedis, the poor man’s cheroots, are a major cause of cancer). As for the forest department, it sees JFM mainly as a mutually beneficial way of rehabilitating degraded forest, but also as a way of generating and providing wage labour as a support to forest-fringe villages.

Bamboo plantation, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. Oct 2011.


However, just because forest restoration is the starting point of JFM (or GIM, or the forest landscape restoration approach,  for that matter), this does not mean that the foresters are entirely neutral to poverty alleviation or equity considerations. After all, as a wing of the state executive, the forest departments also share in the national objectives of improving the condition of the poor, especially the socially and economically deprived (from whose ranks at least 25% of the forest personnel themselves are recruited), in addition to the environmental conservation goals. As a matter of strategy, also, if the department feels that rural poverty is part of the reason why people depend on sale of unsustainably collected wood and other forest products, then improving the rural incomes through other occupations can well become a part of the landscape conservation strategy.

Tussor silk moth larva, Jabalpur, Oct 2011.

Both the supply side and the demand side are then a candidate for the strategy. On the supply side, by creating more biomass (in fringe forest and non-forest lands) specially for the collectors (headloaders) and the local consumers, whether it be fuelwood or poles or bamboos for artisanal raw material, the programme will shift the users to a sustainable extraction regime, thereby saving the forest proper from unregulated hacking, cutting of saplings, setting of fire, etc. (the social forestry strategy). On the demand side, by providing other energy sources (e.g. liquid petroleum gas, solar water heaters and driers, biogas, etc.), the communities are gradually induced to reduce their requirement of forest biomass. By improving water harvesting and thereby supporting agriculture, pressure due to headloading, grazing, etc. on forest may be reduced. Therefore general improvement in the rural economy, e.g. by improving water availability, granting land (even marginal forest or shifting cultivation plots) to the landless (as in the Forest Rights Act, 2006), supporting new livelihoods (forest-based like lac, tussor silk cultivation, or others, like tailoring, computer operation), may well contribute to the ultimate goal of taking pressure off the forests. So the forest departments too may well have a long-term interest in poverty alleviation and equity considerations, and need not be condemned outright as opportunistically using the community as unpaid watchmen.




[1] The programme monitors and implementers would have to be extra vigilant in dealing with non-forest habitats like grasslands and wetlands, in order not to fall into the error of planting up all hectares with dense tree crops.
[2] Crore = 10 million

(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)

References

Dilip Kumar, P.J. 2014b. Climate Change, Forest Carbon Sequestration and REDD-Plus. The Context of India. Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLIX, No.22, May 24, 2014, p.22-25. www.academia.edu/11102870/...

Dilip Kumar, P.J. 2015. Forestry in the 12th plan. No tears for the Planning Commission India. Self-published as Forest Matters, No.7-9, February 2015. Available as a pdf at https://www.academia.edu/10833350/Forestry_in_the_12th_Plan_No_tears_for_the_Planning_Commission_India, and in blog postings at http://forestmatters.blogspot.com/2015/02/08-forestry-and-planning-commission-ii.html

Dilip Kumar, P.J. 2016. Green India Mission. Letters, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol.LI, No.5, Jan 30, 2016, p.4.

Dutta, Sumana. 2016. Continuing the Forest Conservation Debate: Rhetoric and Reality of Green India Mission. Economic & Political Weekly, 23 Jan 2016, Vol.LI, No.4, pp.49-55.

Equations. 2011. Green India Mission: India’s REDD+ Action Plan to disempower and evict forest communities from their own homelands. Equations, December 2011. Author Souparna Lahiri? Available at http://forestindustries.eu/sites/default/files/userfiles/1file/fileDocuments1131_uid18.pdf

Equitable Tourism Organisation (website). Forests, Communities and the “Green India Mission”: Promises and Failures of Ecotourism. (By Equations). Available at http://www.equitabletourism.org/files/fileDocuments1385_uid20.pdf

Government of India. 2010. National Mission for a Green India. National Consultations. Ministry of Environment  and Forests, New Delhi. Available at http://www.moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/green-india-mission.pdf

Government of India. 2011. Green India Mission Brochure dated 26 March 2011 available at the ministry website, http://naeb.nic.in/documents/GIM_Brochure_26March.pdf

Government of India. 2015. Guidelines for convergence of MGNREGS with GIM. Memo .F.No.9-5/2015/GIM/MGNREGS dated 3 March 2015 of the Ministry of  Environment, Forests & Climate Change, New Delhi. Available at  http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/MGNREGS-GIM_0.pdf

Jha, Sourish. 2011?. The Green India Mission (GIM): A Roadmap for Neo-liberal Exploitation in Forest.  http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Documents/Conference_presentations/NatureInc_Sourish_Jha.pdf

Lele, Sharachchandra and Ajit Menon. 2014. Democratizing Forest Governance in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1968. Asian Drama. An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations. Twentieth Century Fund, inc. Reprinted in India 1982, 2004, Kalyani Publishers, New Delhi.


34 Institutionalising change: Western Ghats Forestry Project. Forest Landscape Restoration in India-V.

Western Ghats Forestry Project, Karnataka (1992-2002)

The Western Ghats Forestry (and Environment) Project (WGFP) is cited here specifically, as it was probably the first externally-aided project to make institutional development and policy change its central objective (and also one of the earliest instances of the transition from the physical-output oriented social forestry projects). It is also interesting because there was a major progression from the original proposal of the Karnataka Forest department (KFD) in 1987 (Hobley & Shields, 2000, p.21), which was focused mainly on improving the ecological status of the Western Ghats forests in Karnataka. This was prompted by the department’s perception that the preceding social forestry projects had shifted attention disproportionately to non-forest and degraded forest areas, to the detriment of the ecologically richer forests of the Western Ghats, which were now in dire need of greater investment. Some of the crying priorities in the department’s view were protection from fire, poaching, encroachment, etc.; interventions to encourage regeneration, improve density of growing crops, regenerate blanks and treat insect and disease problems; and so on. But the NGOs and environmentalists put up such a forceful opposition to such a techno-centric proposal (see the interviews with one of the leading NGO activists, Pandurang Hegde, in the webpage of New Internationalist magazine, October 2004)[1], that the British aid agency DFID (or the ODA as it was then known) transformed the whole project into a process-oriented one, and insisted on a process of consultation with local communities for the interventions (including plantations) on the ground.



(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)

Degraded hillsides in North Canara. Masur-Lukkeri, one-year planting. Only exotic Acacia is visible! (Viewed 1990)  

Throughout the project period, teams of DFID consultants were busy on the ground, working with the frontline staff of the department and with communities, designing new planning and monitoring systems to make them bottom-up and ecologically sound (such as Site-Specific Planning or SSP, participatory planning manuals[2] to replace the less flexible Working Plan Code, computerized database and MIS, computerized accounting and reporting systems, strategic planning decision tools,  etc.). Naturally, implementation of the JFM guidelines on the ground was a high priority, so field manuals were drawn up, training given to FD staff, community representatives, NGO support groups, etc., and scores of new village forest committees (VFCs) initiated  and set on the path to formulating micro-plans, signing up to MoUs, and taking up operations on the ground.

The physical targets of plantations of various models (fuelwood/small timber, artisanal raw material like bamboo, fruit/fodder, assisted natural regeneration or ANR, etc.) were substantially fulfilled, totaling to some 50,000 ha as provided in the financial schedules of the project document.  The fuelwood/small timber plantations (mainly of Acacia auriculiformis and Casuarina, both exotics but in use for many decades, and both having nitrogen-fixing nodules in their root systems) was  believed (by the FD) to have substantially reduced the extraction of wood by cartloads from the forests for keeping the home fires burning as well as running hundreds of brick kilns, eateries, tile manufacturies, etc. in the adjoining zones.

This was especially gratifying, as there was a high perennial demand for wood in the cold and wet climate of the Western Ghats. There used to be a particularly pernicious system of pre-paid licenses, under which thousands of cartloads of fuelwood, inevitably mixed up with illicitly felled teak, rosewood and other valuable timbers, used to be allowed under the old privileges, that had been terminated by a particularly courageous minister in the early 1970s (see Shyamsunder and Parameshwarappa, 2014, for an account of this reform). As a consequence, the department had taken on the responsibility of providing the material at controlled rates from a network of depots in the Western Ghats belt and the adjoining plains. 

Greening bare hillsides with Acacia (2-year old) (Viewed 1990)

Acacias from Australia were not anathema to foresters, who saw in it a hardy, self-regenerating (at least in some localities), nitrogen-fixing species with a host of uses, both as smallwood (the timber itself was found to have strength and finish properties close to teak), and as mulch from the leaf litter (a crucial component of agriculture in this high-rainfall zone, see Nadkarni et al.,1989). Acacia auriculiformis  came as a boon in reforesting the highly degraded, eroded, laterised bare hillocks around the forest tracts, and experiments was also being undertaken of interplanting with more ecologically acceptable local species like Emblica, rosewood, Pterocarpus, Lagerstroemia, Terminalia, Adina, etc. in thinned out plantations taking advantage of the improved organic structure of the soil after a few years. Even the relationship of the FD with communities, which tended to be patronizing (as employers and granters of favours) or coercive in the past, have been transformed with the partnership approach under JFM, as readily shared by VFC groups visited by the author (Dilip Kumar, 2014).


Kalam (Mitregyna parvifolia) interplanted in Casuarina, 2-year old (Viewed 1990)

From the point of view of the FD, therefore, the project was surely a resounding success, but it ran into very strident criticism from many quarters. One was the familiar burden of the social environmentalists, which is well represented by Sharachchandra Lele (2003). Some  of the grounds for criticism are that by restricting the JFM mechanism to degraded forest (less than 25% canopy), it ended in putting valuable village grazing lands under tree crops;  the process of formation of VFCs, micro-plan creation and VFC functioning tended to be top-down; there was insufficient attention to “community mobilization and awareness building” so that “VFCs so formed could not generally free themselves from the inherent economic, caste and gender inequalities within villages”; and so on (Lele, op. cit.). Critics seem especially incensed by the fact that in many   cases, plantations were even raised before the VFC was formed, and many times VFCs were given older existing plantations to protect as an incentive (bribe?). Of course, for the FD, such criticisms appear to be mere quibbling. However, Lele does concede that there were some benefits, mostly intangible, like freer interaction between village communities and FD staff, acceptance of the philosophy of people’s participation, and so on (Lele, 2003).

There are apparently two different agendas at work here. The FD personnel, like most government agencies, are keen to get on with the job and achieve concrete results, answerable as they are to audit and the elected government for the money being spent (no matter it comes as a grant from the donor to the central government), and bound as they are by the existing framework of law and policy (flawed or otherwise). The NGOs and social activists, on the other hand, are in the game of actually changing the very basis of the relations between community and state (they have taken seriously Karl Marx’s admonition that the job of the sociologist is to change the world, not just study it). But this is a long and hard path to tread, as found by some of the DFID consultants (Hobley and Shields, 2000):

However, it must be recognised that change is never easy, and that the main delivery agency requires space to make adjustments, not just to processes, but also to attitudes. Change is slowed down by ‘undue’ and heavy pressure from external bodies and by myriad reviews, audits, evaluations all of which demonstrate and show up serious problems in current practice. Without space, without time to rebuild new processes and attitudes, and under pressure to deliver, staff inevitably become defensive and practice returns to the old process and attitude” (Hobley & Shields, 2000, p.8).

One of the limitations[3] of the WGFP was its strategic choice of starting in just one pilot area, and this happened to be North Canara (Uttara Kannada), a highly forested district with relatively low population densities and a resource-rich forest establishment as well as a highly privileged agricultural economy (under the Canara privileges, valley-bottom agriculturists had 9 acres of hill forest or betta land to each acre of cultivated land)[4]. This strategic decision put the following handicaps on mainstreaming of the innovations from the start: a feeling in the rest of the department that the conditions in Canara were so non-typical as to have low applicability in the real world; a lack of sympathy, let alone ownership, in the rest of the department, which may have contributed to a lurking interest in ‘showing up’ the Canara innovations; a sense that the new planning systems were being driven by the consultants (although they did try to maintain the stance that it was developed seemingly by the local staff), and that these systems, though well presented, seemed over-demanding and unnecessarily complicated; a feeling that the project was being run by consultants, for consultants, and some of their local hangers-on; a sense that DFID, in collusion with local NGOs who were out to make their careers at the cost of the department, was trying to dictate policy with a relatively small grant, akin to the tail trying to wag the dog (especially in contrast to the much larger state-wide projects of other agencies, which came without the pressure for drastic policy change); a sense that the project was taking the FD away from the main mandate of improving the physical resource, and taking up too much time of the staff in endless discussions, workshops, training, and so on.

Further, by continually revisiting abstract ideas like the ‘goal’ and ‘purpose’ of the project (a problem inherent to the ‘logframe’ approach to project management), there was a sense of over-analysis and filibustering. The high media attention (mostly adverse) and publicity to the differences aired in the course of periodic reviews and discussions gave the impression that there was a large-scale mismanagement of the project.

The staff of the state Auditor-General also jumped on the adversarial bandwagon, and most of their objections amounted to the fact that actual operations did not adhere strictly to the model-wise targets in the project document (which of course was the result of the DFID treating these as only indicative, since actual operations were to be decided village by village by the communities). The audit wanted even the individual components to match the project document (e.g. different plantation models, but also components like buildings, salaries, equipment, etc.). On the other hand, DFID had pressed the point that even talking of planting models (fuel/small timber, fruit, fodder, artisanal material, NTFP, etc.) was against the philosophy of bottom-up, site-specific, community-level planning. One result of this was that ultimately all the interventions were being reported under the generalized head of miscellaneous plantations, so that it became impossible to explain what exactly could be expected as a return to the communities or the state from all this investment.[5] 

Ultimately, the DFID decided to make a far from satisfactory exit at the end of the (extended) project period, and the second phase of the WGFP, which had been under discussion, was abandoned. All this gave a bad name to the project, to the FD and DFID, and to JFM itself. This experience, as far as the main implementers was concerned, points to the general need to have a well-thought out, mutually validating, exit policy, that does not leave an impression that things have gone horribly wrong. The extreme intellectualism of the DFID consultants, combined with the sense among the NGOs that they could strike at the implementing state agency with lethal effect, combined to negate all the sincere effort that had gone into both the physical and institutional aspects of the project, and in effect succeeded in snatching a humiliating failure from the jaws of success.

This unhappy exit also emphasized the inadequate time spans in the donor agencies’ approach, compared to the long-term commitment that is really required for such changes to be tested and take root on the ground. The project also shows the difficulty that implementing agencies have in responding to the periodic changes that take place in donor theories.[6] This is a factor that should obviously be kept in mind when taking up pilot projects in the ‘landscape’ mode now.





[2] See one such example of a new Forest Management Planning Handbook at: https://f583e02d44080dfb51bc580772467c02fbfe89e0.googledrive.com/host/0B5kizcQrKucOVXdHb2FGc0g4aGM/western-ghats-forestry-project.pdf, accessed December 2014
[3] Unlike the social environmentalists’ viewpoint and the donor agency/ consultants’ analysis, the Karnataka forest department’s (KFD’s) viewpoint has seemingly not been properly articulated. This will probably be the topic for a future paper by the author. 
[4] The main product of these valley bottom ‘gardens’ is the areca nut, a mildly narcotic alkaloid product that is chewed assiduously by itself, or with the betel leaf, or impregnated with tobacco, all over south and southeast Asia, to the grief (as in the case of tobacco and beedis) of the users’ teeth and health.
[5] This is related to the ‘legibility’ concern of governing bodies when they take up interventions (Scott, 1999).
[6] It appears that the international donor community changes tack every decade or so: in forestry, from business models at one time, to financial efficiency (well illustrated by the National Commission on Agriculture, 1976), followed by massive industrial forest plantations sponsored by the World Bank in the 1970s (see Barnes et al., 1982); then Social Forestry as a panacea in the 1980s; then to community forestry, participatory approaches, during the 1990s; then to empowerment and transfer of ownership to communities and withdrawal of support to the agencies of the state in the 2000s (witness the writings on democratization of forest governance, as laid out in Lele & Menon, 2014); and now the holistic, all-embracing view of the landscape approach. Since the actual cycle of each approach seems to have been around a decade, the implementers are always at the receiving end of the critical backlash at the end of the project cycle of 10 years. 

(A pdf file of the entire article is available at https://www.academia.edu/21490696/Forest_Landscape_Restoration_in_India_Antecedents_experience_and_prognoses)

References

Barnes, Douglas F., Julia C.Allen, William Ramsay. April 1982. Social Forestry in Developing Nations. (Unpublished). The Centre for Energy  Policy Research. Resources For the Future, Washington, D.C. April 1982. Available at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAY447.pdf

Dilip Kumar, P.J. 2014. Managing India’s Forests: Village Communities, Panchayati Raj Institutions and the State. Monograph No.32. Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore. Available at http://www.academia.edu/9235210/Managing_India_s_Forests_Village_Communities_Panchayati_Raj_Institutions_and_the_State

Hobley, Mary and Dermot Shields. 2000. The Reality of Trying to Transform Structures and Processes: Forestry in Rural Livelihoods. Working paper 132, February 2000. Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London. Available at http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2742.pdf

Lele, Sharachchandra. 2003. Participatory Forest management in Karnataka: At the Crossroads. Community Forestry, Vol.2, Issue 4, May 2003, p.4-11. Available at: http://www.ces.iisc.ernet.in/biodiversity/sahyadri_enews/newsletter/issue21/pdfs/PFM%20in%20Karnataka.pdf

Lele, Sharachchandra and Ajit Menon. 2014. Democratizing Forest Governance in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Nadkarni, M.V., with S.A.Pasha and L.S.Prabhakar. 1989. The Political Economy of Forest Use and Management. Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore. Sage Publications, New Delhi and London.  

NCA. 1976. Report of the National Commission on Agriculture. Part IX, Forestry. National Commission on Agriculture. Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Government of India, New Delhi. (Available at http://krishikosh.egranth.ac.in/bitstream/1/2041449/1/CCS323.pdf)

Scott, James C. 1999.Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press.

Shyamsunder, S. and S.Parameshwarappa. 2014. Forest Conservation Concerns in India. Bio-Green Books. (Review by Ullas karanth, available at http://www.deccanherald.com/content/438364/forests-india-balancing-ecological-human.html)